ArmInfo.Yerevan, In late September, the Mining Armenia Forum was held in Armenia, organized by the Union of Miners and Metallurgists of Armenia. The forum was attended by representatives from almost all mining companies in the country, specialists in various fields, environmentalists, representatives from various NGOs, and foreign guests.
The government was poorly represented, with only the head of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Gnel Sanosyan, speaking at the forum. The Ministry of Economy, the Finance Ministry, and tax authorities deemed their presence unnecessary, despite the industry being the foundation of the country's economy. ArmInfo News Agency has interviewed Artur Ashugyan, a former head of the Mining Industry Department of the Ministry of Economy and now an independent expert in the field to discuss the role the state should play in the development of the mining industry in Armenia.
- How do you think the mining conference went? What are your impressions, given your extensive experience coordinating the sector's activities for many years, even before privatization?
- To be honest, I found the conference to be quite enjoyable. It was a first of its kind in Armenia, with impressive organization, large number of participants, and meaningful discussions on industry issues and challenges. A lot of credit goes to the leadership of the Union and ZMMC for identifying key industry challenges. Despite the packed agenda, the conference successfully highlighted the industry's main issues that need to be addressed. And to be honest, I couldn't help but feel a sense of deja vu during the conference. It was as if the past 25 years of reforms in legislation had not taken place, with the same questions, problems and same approaches being discussed. It made me feel somehow younger. And of course, the fundamental question that emerged was the relationship between the State and investor. Why the basic one? The situation is similar to a couple in a long-term civil partnership or cohabitation - they have children, a home, and one of the partners consistently demands "let's get married, let's sign a marriage contract", only to be met with "these are all formalities, we are doing well as is, why do we need these formalities"? What do you mean, why? To move to a new legal phase of the relationship! For having confidence in the future! No marriage contract is necessary when things are going well, it becomes essential - when they are not. From this perspective, it was important to listen and communicate with our foreign guests. While there were only a few foreign participants, and they were presented at the expert level, nevertheless, in my opinion, they still made a valuable contribution to the discussion regarding the industry's future prospects. I was especially impressed by the speech given by a Kazakh colleague regarding the legislative reforms in the mining sector in Kazakhstan. These reforms have played a significant role in the advancement of mining and in attracting investment to this country. One piece of advice that resonated with me was the importance of not initiating reforms unless you are certain that you will complete the reforms. Unfortunately, this phrase accurately reflects the current state of reforms in our country.
- And why are there no regulations in place currently? After all, as far as I remember, the legislation in this field was once considered the most advanced. Has this important component ceased to be effective now?
- The need for reforms in mining was acknowledged at the start of the millennium, leading to the prioritization of the industry and adjustments to the privatization program. Mining enterprises were privatized following the adoption of the Law on CONCESSIONS, that is, the adoption of the rules of the game . The Law on Concessions was adopted and in 2003 it received the main prize in the nomination of the best legislation . I would like to proudly note that the ideology of this law and its verification remain relevant even now. The law established new ethics and rules of relations between the State and the investor, a kind of strong marriage of convenience, with a contractual agreement. Discussions at the forum, especially behind the scenes, underscored the necessity of clearly defined rules for these interactions. But enacting and implementing a law is one thing, while comprehending its implications is another: well, as a result, the advice from a Kazakh colleague. Often, even now, the question of the states' role is oversimplified, focusing solely on technical and regulatory standards, and viewing the state's role as complete control and the authority to regulate the rules of the game. However, the unique nature of mining requires a different approach. Firstly, the added value is generated from scratch, secondly, we trade in exchange goods, meaning that the prices for products are determined by exchange rather than the manufacturer. Thirdly, and most importantly, the state has a dual role in mining. In addition to its regular business relationships, there are also relationships of business partners, as the subsoil is the state inalienable property, from which it actually earns additional income in the form of royalties. This second role is the stumbling block. Therefore, it is crucial to establish stable rules of the game.
- What's wrong? What's the issue?
It's all about the lack of rules in the game and the lack of guarantees for investors. This is despite the fact that the mining industry in Armenia is the most investment-intensive sector of our economy, and until now the largest direct foreign investments have been made here, creating high-paying jobs and forming social infrastructure around enterprises and at the expense of enterprises in the regions. But, unfortunately, no progress has been made in the last 15-20 years in terms of reforms and stimulating industry development. If the state were to wash its hands of everything, I probably wouldn't be too worried, but on the contrary, it doesn't just interfere, it interferes when it pleases. The state should act as a guarantor of investments in the industry. And these guarantees, first of all, consist of creating legislatively prescribed rules of the game and strictly following them.
And how did the destruction of what was established at the non-regulatory level start ?
- It was a gradual process. Certain rules were simply violated and the Law on Concessions was dismantled bit by bit through various related laws. There is no longer a unified law and there are no guarantees for investors seeking stable, serious long-term commitments. In the 2000s, we dedicated considerable efforts to this matter, recognizing its importance in attracting strategic investments. We had hoped that both past and future governments, would acknowledge the significance of this task and fully commit to the reform. We succeeded here, as everywhere else. We enacted the law, received global acclaim and praise, and that's it! The reform process didn't advance as expected. There were no well - defined by-laws, structures governing the industry. After all, it was initially assumed that the Law on Concessions would be integrated into a comprehensive Mining Code, that would address all aspects of the relationship between the state and the investors, investment, and the technical aspects of the industry.
- And now all this is gone?
- No. And this is sad. There are no established rules of the game, no long-term strategic investments in place. It appears that we are not yet at a mature stage in this regard. In Kazakhstan they are, but we are not! After all, the Law on Concessions is the cornerstone of this strategy, regulating economic relations between investors and the state by 90%. Unlike other industries, the peculiarity of mining as a business is that the investor creates added value from scratch, using state property - the country's ore reserves. On the other hand, this is a long-term business. This is not commerce, and not even construction, this is a serious business, where the investments may take 5, 10, or even 15 years to pay off. All of this necessitates thorough calculations based on serious research and huge investments. The concession agreement serves precisely the purpose of regulating the relationship between the state and the investor for many years, legally binding them and establishing the rules of the game for at least 25, or even more years. And no one has the right to violate these rules. But in our country, this principle has not worked. The state is constantly tempted to make changes, recalculate something, or snatch something. As a rule, this is usually either driven by the interests of specific individuals, or, more commonly, for fiscal motives, based on the principle of . And the fact that you can't do that with an investor doesn't seem to interest anyone. It reflects a shopkeeper mentality that overlooks reputation and is generally unable to work for the long term.
- I understand your point. There are many examples from both the distant and recent past. We can recall how tax officials, following directives from their superiors, simply intractable investors by recalculating taxes and royalties. After these investors had invested millions in building an enterprise, they were then given ...
- Yes, unfortunately, this is true. Calculating royalties for our tax officials has proven to be a . They didn't know how to do it, and since they lack the knowledge, they don't want to do it. The size and calculation of royalties have undergone multiple changes in recent years. Royalty is a fee paid for the use of state property. In our initial royalty scheme, the maximum percentage was up to 10.8%, applied to all super profits. This percentage has now increased significantly. Currently, we have one of the highest royalty rates in the world.
- What is the problem with high royalties?
- They come from selling the resources that you extracted. For example, if you produced a certain amount of copper concentrate and sold this copper at a certain price based on the exchange rate, you would than pay royalties from it. Royalty reduces the profit tax base. That is, before calculating the profit tax, you pay your royalty. The more you pay royalties, the less the profit tax. And the challenge lies in the base royalty rate, as metal prices are determined by the exchange, and may not always increase. If the base royalty rate is high, it could make the project unprofitable. By the way, the law and the royalty formula were established in 2001-2002 when metal prices were at their lowest in 25 years. We can discuss the definitions of super profits, increasing additional percentages, but increasing the base percentage is highly undesirable. And yes, of course, the percentages in the royalty calculation formula should remain unchanged or don't become more burdensome.
- I see, and what happened to the law and the reform?
- They have ceased to exist, they have slowly and quietly passed away: In Armenia, a genuine concession agency has never been esablished. It turned out to be functionally castrated by the split of decision-making powers between two ministries. As of now, one can only speculate on what might have been. Then they gradually eliminated one of the most basic instruments of the new law - a complex license, requiring a license agreement. This is no longer just a piece of paper. Beneath the document lies a full-fledged license agreement outlining the economic conditions for field development and serving as a long-term investment project. The main thing is that any changes made by the state, such as tax legislation, don't take immediate effect. Instead, there is a temporary adjustment period, for example, 5 years, granted to the investor. The investor gets the right to either work under the old taxation scheme, or switch to a new one, if he wishes. The agreement excludes many outdated concepts that hinder the progress. The main principle is that products, like copper concentrate, are considered exchange commodities, and their price are determined not by the will of the investor, but by the of the free exchange market. Additionally, new postulates are replacing old approaches and calculations. Essentially it's a return to traditional principles. No matter how we try to reform, we seem to end up with a Soviet state farm.
- Much of what you are referring to was outlined in the first foreign investment law, which was successfully forgotten just two years later.
- Yes. We can say that the law on concessions was an extension of this legislation designed to encourage investments in businesses related to state owned assets, such as subsoil resources. The repeal of these laws and a significant setback in reforms resulted in a decrease in investment appeal, both nationally and within the mining sector, specifically. The reason, as I have already emphasized, is the lack of clear initial conditions and rules of the game that are understandable to the investor. The law was written for them and in their . And as one of the ministers once told me, . I responded by saying that . Our system is still burdened with remnants of past economic relations, with many structures having unclear control functions. The belief that only hardware transformations can solve all problems is still alive. It is quite natural for an investor to seek additional guarantees for the best conditions for themselves, which can hinder business development when these guarantees are lacking. As a result, additional agreements are concluded, and there are still no strict general rules. A notable example of this is the suspended Amulsar project. No matter what anyone says, this was a big blow to the country's investment attractiveness. And, to be fair, this is not the first setback for this project. There was also 2013, when the project was on the verge of closure. After all, initially this project was given the green light and a dedicated lane was provided. Investors spent more than 250 million dollars and... a classic of the genre, . Base on my analysis, if the Amulsar project had not been halted in 2018, it would have started operating in 2019 and generated close to half a billion dollars by 2020. At the current gold price and production rate of 210 thousand ounces per year (about $2,700 per ounce), the project would have yielded about $600 million in sales annually. It seems that the budget didn't factor in significant tax deductions amounting to hundreds of millions. I am not even talking about the high multiplier effect of these investments, as well as the uniqueness of this project, in terms of both technological and economic efficiency. After all, the gold content stands at 0.7 grams per ton of ore:
- But it is clear that Amulsar became a victim of domestic political processes to "rock the boat".
- If there had been a strong legislative framework, this situation could have been avoided! In this and similar cases, the laws should function regardless of changes in government. These are the guarantees for concession I am talking about. However, they do not currently exist, and we naively ask ourselves, why serious investors do not come to the country? The Amulsar project emerged in the mid-2000s when Armenia ranked first as a country with the best legislation, providing investors in this area with the best opportunities. Who suffered the most as a result? I believe the ones who suffered the most were not just the various investors of Western pension funds, but our own country.
- Today, the new government appears to be tackling this issue by receiving shares of the same Amulsar mine as a gift. Some shares of the Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Plant have already been transferred. What kind of mechanism is this? To be honest, I do not understand it. Supposedly, the government will advocate for and safeguard.
- From whom? From itself? Where to lobby? Like you, I could not understand what kind of measure this is. Why do this? This is not a function of the state at all. The state should establish strict rules in its relationship with the investor, and not enter into a relationship with them without a marriage contract. After all, if there is a concession agreement, the state must protect both the investments and the agreed rights of the investor, and ensure the protection of its own interests and property. After all, no one has yet canceled marriage swindlers! The key aspect of the Concession Agreement is that the state retains ownership of the resources being invested in and it is responsible for ensuring their protection to promote efficiency and attractiveness.
- If I remember correctly, the idea was that setting up processing plants locally instead of exporting raw materials would help to revive the country's lost industrial potential, particularly in cable production and other heavy industries. About 10 years ago, you were directly involved in a project to build a smelter - a copper smelter. What are your current thoughts on this topic?
- Well, not 10 years, but 20 or even 25, these and similar ideas are periodically brought up. I can't offer any optimistic outlook. What is preventing the revival of cable production? Is it the historical reluctance of the Armenian people towards cable? No. The main issue is the necessity of cheap, easily accessible cathode copper for competitiveness. But where can we get it? Of course, from the local copper smelter. And where can we get copper concentrate for the plant. It's right there. However, challenges arise at this point. We don't have that much copper, as it's not currently being extracted alas. We need to boost copper production by at least 2.5-3 times. And how can we achieve that? That's correct, through investments, but what is that? Let's return again to the QUESTION of the relationship. Currently, very large smelters are being constructed, and as a rule, near the coast or close to it and with relatively cheap energy. Or, perhaps ironically - we need to have the Soviet Union, where both transport and energy cost pennies. And today, unfortunately, we are dealing with inefficient and costly logistics, expensive energy and limited resource base. That is, all the fundamental basic conditions for building a smelter are not suitable, in principle. Even if we were to try to build the smallest, least efficient smelter with a capacity of 100,000 units- we would still not have enough raw materials for it. At most, half. Just think, if we were to ship ore from Chile, it would be more precious than gold. At one point, our neighbors, the Iranians, built the Sar-Cheshmeh plant near the Persian Gulf, in the port of Bandar Abbas, with the capacity to accommodate 50,000 tons of dry cargo ships. Despite having significant copper reserves, Iran imports additional copper-rich concentrate from Chile. We cannot afford to do the same, as it would result in zero efficiency. I am not saying anything about the gas price. Why not consider exploring other options? For example, during the privatization of ZMMK, a condition was set that all molybdenum supplied by ZMMK must be processed in Armenia. As a result, with the expansion of capacity and production, new plants were opened for the production of ferromolybdenum. This is a widely used product in the steel industry, with high demand and value. Now new enterprises are being established: profitable and effective! No need to "blow the wool over the hedgehog", it will not work. We need to identify profitable niches with low logistics costs that are still open in global markets. Many markets are already saturated so it is not advisable for newcomers to enter those. The same applies to gold refining, which is a fairly simple procedure and building a plant is not an issue. We can engage in gold mining, and aim to reach a production level of 7-8 tons with the launch of Amusar. However, certifying this product will be very difficult due to huge costs, challenges and standards. Not everyone is allowed, not everyone is welcome. Why? The dore alloy we produce in the country is a completely exportable product. It is important to understand that mining and processing plants, metallurgy, traders, and portfolio investors are all distinct and specialized components of the global mining industry. You understand, this is no longer the USSR, where hundreds of train cars of ore from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were sent to the gold extraction plant in Ararat. Now such cooperation is no longer feasible, even within the EAEU. We have a lot of goods that are almost ready for export. These includes almost all industrial building materials and non-metallic materials, which are affordable, but heavily reliant on logistics. You cannot, for example, transport tuff and basalt to Russia in large quantities. While smaller quantities can be exported for exclusive projects like constructing a palace for a rich Armenian or an Armenian church, mass export is impossible, as it is very expensive. However, there are niches, we need to break through, we need to attract investors. We must entice them with stability, immutability and clarity of rules and legislative guarantees from the state. Naturally, the long overdue reform of investment legislation, particularly, the concession law is not a panacea for all issues, but a necessary condition for further development. This modernized Union can be the initiator, otherwise why identify problems without implementing solutions? It is vital to avoid repeating past mistakes. The Government has accumulated a large information base. And yes, do not embark on reforms unless you are committed to seeing them through to completion. And you need to start, it is imperative!